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Multilateral Intelligence Collaboration and International 
Oversight 
Janine McGruddy 
 
Introduction 
Since 9/11 the range of partners in the intelligence world that share information at the 
international level has grown exponentially. There seems to be little or no oversight at this 
level of sharing and this paper proposes several options for attaining some kind of oversight 
agreement between the intelligence agencies that collaborate in this way. This may also foster 
the development of international intelligence standards, the breakdown of asymmetric 
intelligence relationships and ultimately the creation of an international regime of intelligence 
sharing and a global forum for collaboration between trusted partners. 
 
What is “multilateral intelligence collaboration”?  
“Given the inherently secretive character of secret intelligence, there is 
immediately a tension between the need to maintain the secret, on the one 
hand, and sharing the secret – or operating in a more open and collaborative 
manner – on the other.”1  
Warren Tucker, Head of the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service.  
 
The definition of multilateral intelligence collaboration used for this paper has been 
developed from the following definitions: A multilateral agreement is an accord among three 
or more parties, agencies, or national governments.2 Intelligence as defined by Walshand 
adopted for this paper “is the collection, protection, and analysis of both publicly available 
and secret information, with the goal of reducing decision makers’ uncertainty about a 
foreign policy problem”.3  The oxford dictionary defines collaboration as being ‘the action of 
working with someone to produce something’. So multilateral intelligence collaboration for 
the purpose of this paper is an accord among three or more agencies or national governments 
working together to collect, protect and analyse information to reduce decision makers 
uncertainty about a foreign policy. 
 
There is no denying the rate of change with regards to multilateral intelligence collaboration 
in the last ten years. The change has been both quantitative and qualitative, and improved 
intelligence co-operation has changed the way in which agencies work.4 Intelligence 
collaboration occurs when both sides can see potential benefits, be it from gaining 
information that helps complete the jigsaw,  reducing the need for expensive surveillance in 
other countries, or more recently, less developed nations gaining precious aid resources.5 
                                                             
1
 Born, Hans, International intelligence cooperation and accountability (Milton Park: Routledge, 2011), 23. 
2
 Define “Multi-Lateral Agreement,” available at: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/multilateral-
agreement.html. 
3
 Walsh, James Igoe, The international politics of intelligence sharing (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2010), 5. 
4
 Richard J. Aldrich, “Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem,” 
Intelligence and National Security 24:1 (2009): 54. 
5
 Stéphane Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation,” International 
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16:4 (2003): 534, 537. 
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It is common knowledge that intelligence suffers from a paradox - it is only valuable when 
shared with those who need it, but the more it is shared the more it risks being compromised, 
and the lower its value.6 James Clapper, current Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the 
USA describes getting this right as the ‘sweet spot’ between sharing and protecting 
information.7 The question is how do we decide who we trust enough to share with? 
From the beginning of human history, the idea that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” 
has encouraged intelligence sharing between nations.8 In a globalised world the shared 
enemies of democratic nations have shifted from the boundaries of other nations (as 
epitomised by the Cold War) to more amorphous threats such as terrorism, human trafficking, 
and drug smuggling. Dealing with these international issues realistically requires an 
international approach – enter multilateral intelligence collaboration. A good example of this 
in action is the UKUSA agreement, a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the UK born 
out of WWII that has evolved into a multilateral agreement including Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and other third party nations, over time.9 
 
Multilateral intelligence collaboration can bring a new light to these global problems by 
“bringing diverse perspectives together.”10 This gives the nations involved in this type of 
collaboration the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ to deal with complex issues.11 Another benefit of 
multilateral intelligence collaboration is the: “possibility of developing more common 
vocabularies for thinking about problems with fewer inter-cultural and international 
misunderstandings.”12 
 
No one country can effectively cover all the areas of interest that their intelligence collection 
requirements demand. By dividing up areas of responsibility amongst partner nations more 
ground can be covered in more depth than by working in isolation. It is also a fact of the 
current economic climate that no one nation can afford to pay the bill for comprehensive 
global intelligence collection. 
 
Why is international oversight needed? 
Oversight at the international level is needed because the globalization of intelligence directly 
creates an accountability deficit.13 The need for international oversight of multilateral 
intelligence collaboration and the issues at hand have been cited many times in a range of 
intelligence publications.14  
                                                             
6
 Best, Richard A., & Library of Congress. Congressional Research, Service, 2011. Intelligence information 
need-to-know vs. need-to-share, 1. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Derek S. Reveron, “Counterterrorism and Intelligence Cooperation,” Journal of Global Change and 
Governance, 1:3 (2008): 13. 
9
 “UKUSA Agreement,” available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UKUSA_Agreement; This is an excellent 
example of a long running multilateral intelligence collaboration agreement. 
10
 Roger Z. George, “Meeting 21st century transnational challenges: Building a Global Intelligence Paradigm,” 
CIA Center for the study of intelligence, (2007): 151, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no3/building-a-global-intelligence-
paradigm.html. 
11
 “Wisdom of the Crowd,” available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisdom_of_the_crowd. 
12
 George, Meeting 21st century transnational challenges, 151. 
13
 Elizabeth Sepper, “Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence Sharing,” Texas International Law Journal, 
46:1 (2010):171; Adam D. M. Svendsen, “The Globalization of Intelligence Since 9/11: The Optimization of 
Intelligence Liaison Arrangements,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21:4 (2008): 
672. 
14
 Maciej Osowski, “EU-US intelligence sharing post 9/11: predictions for the future,” e-International 
Relations, (2011): 27; Scott, L. V., & Jackson, Peter, Understanding intelligence in the twenty-first century: 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 5
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss5/24
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Wills et al in understanding intelligence oversight note the following four problems facing 
international intelligence cooperation.15  Firstly, this collaboration potentially poses 
significant risks to human rights. Intelligence services could use personal data in a way that 
violates human rights. They acknowledge that although as rule intelligence services tell a 
foreign partner how information they share can be used, in reality they have little control over 
its use. 
 
Secondly, how do we know how the information was obtained? Has torture or other unlawful 
methods been used? If agencies are aware that collection probably violated human rights, 
does that make them complicit? 
 
Thirdly, what if intelligence services are using collaboration with foreign partners as an 
excuse to avoid oversight of their own less than legitimate collection methods? 
 
Finally, agency cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies has the risk of interfering with 
their state’s foreign policy.  
 
As we will see, despite the challenges (and there are many) of developing oversight at this 
level, for intelligence to be a legitimate part of democracy it needs to be accountable. 
Facing the challenges of international multilateral intelligence collaboration 
There are of course in reality, many constraints on formal co-operation in the current 
situation.16 The nature and extent of intelligence co-operation may be influenced by several 
factors:17 
 
• Differences in perceptions of a threat and the foreign policy objectives of the 
respective states. 
• Asymmetrical power relations between states. 
• Poor human rights records of a potential partner. 
• Differences in legal parameters and standards. 
• Third Party Rule or fear of disclosure of information. 
• Abuse or misuse of intelligence that has been shared. 
• Worries about defection. 
 
These factors help to highlight the need for strong governance and oversight in intelligence 
collaboration. The issues listed above need addressing, for example, how do agencies in 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
journeys in shadows (London: Routledge, 2004), 20; Aldrich, Global Intelligence Co-operation versus 
Accountability, 27; Aldrich notes that this is an area that has long been identified ‘as an area opaque to 
oversight’; Gill, Peter, Policing politics: security intelligence and the liberal democratic state (London: F. Cass, 
1994): 217; Sepper, Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence Sharing, 171; “Apathetic oversight bodies 
combined with few statutory restraints make intelligence networks and their activities outside the domestic 
sphere the area of weakest oversight and thus accountability. As we will see, the failure to take transnational 
relationships into account can render statutes limiting intelligence activity in the domestic sphere practically 
toothless as well.” 
15
 Wills, Aidan, & Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed, Forces, Guidebook: understanding 
intelligence oversight (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2007), 
25-26. 
16
 Tuzuner, Musa, Intelligence cooperation practices in the 21st century: towards a culture of sharing. 
(Washington, D.C.: IOS Press, 2010), 150; It is important here to acknowledge the informal information sharing 
that goes on at the global level, which no doubt has a big influence on intelligence product. 
17
 Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation,” 534-536. 
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multilateral sharing arrangement deal with third party rule, (originator control – ORCON) 
which prevents the sharing of information with third parties without the prior permission of 
the original owner of the information in a multilateral intelligence sharing arrangement.18 
This is where effective oversight may help address some of these issues and increase the 
legitimacy of multilateral intelligence agreements. 
 
Despite the lack of discussion about the growing rate of international intelligence sharing 
arrangements, formal and informal, the importance of this work needs to be recognised and 
regulated to a degree, especially around oversight.19 Firstly, how do we deal with some of the 
above issues? 
 
Whether at the national or international level, the quality of the intelligence depends on the 
quality of the source. Collaboration can help by confirming or corroborating information. 
Again, this is where data integration technology could prove to be a game changer.20 
Unfortunately, there is always the fear of defection by a state involved in information sharing. 
James Igoe Walsh, in his book The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, seeks to 
provide a solution to the problem of defection by states in information sharing arrangements. 
He suggests that states seeking bilateral information sharing (as opposed to multilateral 
collaborative intelligence) should be in control of the other (subordinate) states intelligence 
gathering activities.21 He refers to this system as ‘hierarchy’, whereby the stronger state by 
means of ‘relational contracting’ has control of the weaker states intelligence operations.22 
This is at face value a rational approach for powerful states to the problem of defection in 
intelligence sharing, but one that also adds to the asymmetry of current intelligence sharing 
efforts. While Walsh is correct in stating that oversight is necessary when intelligence sharing 
occurs to ensure authenticity, it seems that his focus is on one way information sharing (raw 
data) from the weaker to the stronger nation, rather than collaboration (intelligence collection, 
collaborative analysis and product development).23  
 
Governance and oversight of International Intelligence Collaboration 
International intelligence collaboration has always been fraught with problems for authorities 
responsible for oversight, the scale of growth in this area since 9/11 has been such that 
Aldrich contends: 
 
“The scope and scale of co-operation has resulted in a qualitative change that 
now renders traditional forms of accountability - rooted in the sovereign 
nation-state - increasingly outmoded and incomplete.”24 
 
Intelligence has undergone a revolution of sorts and is no longer the passive world of “Cold 
War bean-counting.”25  Today’s intelligence product needs to provide enforcement agencies 
and policy makers with the knowledge of what immediate threats they need to respond to and 
                                                             
18
 Born, International intelligence cooperation and accountability,15, 5, 283. 
19
 Lefebvre, The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation, 528. 
20
 An example of this type of technology being adopted by the “Five Eyes” multilateral intelligence sharing 
arrangement is Palantir technology; available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palantir_Technologies for more 
detail. 
21
 Walsh, The international politics of intelligence sharing. 
22
 Ibid, 5. 
23
 Ibid, 6. 
24 Aldrich, Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability, 30.  
25
 Ibid, 55. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 5
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss5/24
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disrupt, as well as those that require long term solutions.26 At the same time, intelligence 
services are themselves under growing scrutiny from global civil society. In the absence of 
any established international institutions, Aldrich suggests that intelligence services would be 
wise to engage with these first glimmerings of global governance, rather than hide from 
them.27 
 
As Born et al note oversight is “good for [the] intelligence community as it can contribute to 
thoughtful crafting of intelligence operations, and more importantly, provide them with 
legitimacy.”28 
 
Perhaps a more multilateral approach to oversight of information sharing than Walsh’s 
hierarchy would result in a less asymmetrical relationship?  Such an approach could start with 
a group of like-minded states, already sharing intelligence, widening their circle to work with 
other states in their specialist areas. As Walsh quite rightly points out, co-operating states that 
agree to specialise can together create a much stronger and more comprehensive intelligence 
picture/product than a state could ever achieve in isolation29. Imagine many states co-
operating and using the same software to share information on a secure platform. This would 
allow all members to analyse the data and share conclusions. This may initially only be used 
for less politically sensitive information sharing and collaboration, at the lower classified end 
of the scale, as trust and agreement on collection and sharing protocols are developed, and 
defection is less of a risk. 
 
While defection by states in information sharing arrangements is a real concern, taking over 
the control of the process by the strongest state is not helpful in the long term for the 
development of mutual trust, and certainly not in the best interests of the weaker participating 
state.  A more multilateral approach would require developing an agreed set of standards for 
education, intelligence collection and analysis and protocols for sharing and collaboration, 
and of course, a strong and effective oversight body. 
 
What makes an intelligence oversight body strong and effective? Born et al30 have come up 
with the five following key components: 
 
1. Independence 
2. Investigative powers 
3. Full access  
4. Able to maintain secrets 
5. Support staff 
 
As Reveron notes, a world free of suspicion may be an unreasonable demand, but “mutual 
trust, compatible systems, and common laws and policies are required” in order to effectively 
face global threats.31  
 
                                                             
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Aldrich, Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability, 55. 
28
 Born, H., Johnson, Loch K., Leigh, I., Winkler, Theodor, & Mevik, Leif. Who's watching the spies? : 
establishing intelligence service accountability (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005): 239. 
29
 Walsh, The international politics of intelligence sharing, 7. 
30
 Born, Johnson, Leigh, Winkler and Mevik, Who's watching the spies, 235-236. 
31
 Reveron, Counterterrorism and Intelligence Cooperation, 13. 
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To overcome the challenge of secure collaboration across a diverse group of allies, the United 
States developed a new information-sharing architecture called Combined Enterprise 
Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS).32 Similarly, Palantir have a suite of digital 
solutions for secure information sharing that are already being utilised by the ‘Five Eyes’ 
(Australian, Canadian, British, United States and New Zealand) nations for collaboration.33 
Effectively these types of systems enable digital multilateral collaboration by a range of 
partners. 
 
These co-operating intelligence groups could also provide training and professional 
development for their members, along with opportunities to work in each other’s agencies. 
This type of professional reciprocity would have a homogenizing effect.34 With more and 
more reciprocal relationships (e.g. intelligence collaboration and sharing) actors involved 
start thinking and acting more and more alike, leading to an emerging regime.35 
Taken further, this could lead to the standardisation of intelligence gathering, record keeping, 
civil rights protection and intelligence sharing along the line of the Industry ISO9000.36 This 
would begin to address many of the barriers to information sharing mentioned earlier – 
simply put, if a state or agency will not answer to the standards, or at least prove that they are 
working towards attaining them, they cannot be part of the sharing arrangement. That would 
indeed be a game changer, and would most definitely require oversight by trusted parties. 
Aldrich suggests that collaborating states could provide: “Inspectors General with extended 
authority to operate in more than one country.”
37
 As he points out, if states can agree on the 
complex information sharing agreements, then surely they can agree on criteria for 
investigating officers. He envisaged someone like a former head of national service, acting as 
a roving Inspector General. This person would be responsible for oversight of states involved 
in multilateral intelligence sharing arrangements.38 Instead of a large and powerful state like 
the US providing oversight on a ‘trust us’ basis, (Walsh’s relational contracting concept) it 
could use ‘relational sub-contracting’. This could perhaps initially see trusted partners in a 
multilateral arrangement (e.g. ‘Five Eyes’) providing oversight services for newer 
intelligence sharing relationships, which could encourage trust, and be a less asymmetrical 
and hegemonic arrangement than Walsh’s solution. 
 
Walsh suggests, at least in reference to European Union intelligence collaboration, that:39  
 
“Developing oversight mechanisms that more effectively allow member states to 
monitor each other’s collection and sharing activities and to punish violations would 
make the Union’s sharing arrangements more effective.”  
One assumes that this approach would be just as beneficial for intelligence 
relationships between the United States and its allies as well? 
 
Does oversight help or hinder intelligence agencies?  
                                                             
32
 Ibid, 10. 
33
 “Intelligence,” Palantir, available at: http://www.palantir.com/solutions/intelligence/.  
34
 Tuzuner, Intelligence cooperation practices in the 21st century, 150 
35
 Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory,” 721. 
36
 Tuzuner, Intelligence cooperation practices in the 21st century, 150; On the importance of informal channels 
in the reality of intelligence sharing. 
37
 Aldrich, “Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability,” 56. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Walsh, “Defection and Hierarchy in International Intelligence Sharing,” 180. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 5
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss5/24
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For those that are fearful of the effect of greater oversight of intelligence agencies, it is noted 
here that greater oversight of the Australian intelligence agencies:40 
 
“Appears to have increased staff morale, client satisfaction, and general 
efficiency.  In addition, greater oversight has probably improved the image of 
the agencies with the public and improved their effectiveness and relevance, 
and thereby their image, within government itself.” 
 
In order to create a future savvy international intelligence regime, the international 
intelligence community and their respective states need to embrace the type of multilateral 
intelligence collaboration described in this paper. For intelligence to be seen as a public good, 
oversight responsibility must be shared amongst all nations involved in multilateral 
agreements to avoid asymmetry in relationships. By encouraging standardised, high-level 
intelligence practice and collaboration, along with databases that can enable collaboration, a 
regime will be built that will benefit the intelligence community specifically, and society in 
general by helping to ensure best practice and reliable, quality intelligence product. The 
opportunities explored in this paper warrant further research, development and critical 
discussion by the Intelligence Community globally. As the primary audience for this paper is 
the people responsible for intelligence education, it would be great to see this conversation 
continue at the grassroots in the classroom.  
                                                             
40
 Geoffrey Weller, “Oversight of Australia's Intelligence Services,” International Journal of Intelligence and 
CounterIntelligence 12:4 (1999): 500. 
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